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In this article we study free toposes with the help of intuitionist type theory. Our treatment is self-contained and aims to be accessible to both categorists and logicians. We attempt to explain the relevant logic to the former and the categorical applications to the latter. Algebraically, free toposes arise as solutions to a universal problem, which amounts to constructing a left adjoint to the forgetful functor Top+Graph. Here "Top" denotes the category of small toposes, which we shall assume to possess a natural number object, with appropriate morphisms. These are essentially the socalled logical functors, except that we insist on them being strict functors which preserve everything on the nose. "Graph" denotes the category of graphs, which we take to be oriented, and functor-like morphisms.
The adjoint functor Graph-Top associates to each graph Y-the topos 7(.r') freely generated by s: In particular, when .f' = 0 is the empty graph, we obtain the so-called free topos 7(O), which is an initial object in Top.
Lawvere has often pointed out the strong connection between topos theory and higher order intuitionist logic. It is precisely in the construction of the free topos that this connection is seen most easily. In Section 1 we present a formulation of intuitionist type theory with product types and mention the fundamental theorem which comprises three things:
(1) the consistency of intuitionist type theory, (2) the v-property which asserts that if pvq is provable then either p or q is provable, ( 3) The 3-property which asserts that if 3.,-E.q q(x) is provable, then q(a) is provable for some term a of type A.
Our type-theoretical language contains enough terms to witness all existential theorems; yet it does not contain too many terms, for example, it lacks a description operator.
The fundamental theorem can be proved by several methods: (a) the cut elimination method of Gentzen-Girard, * The first author was supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and shared a grant from the Quebec Department of Education.
(b) the realizability method of Kleene-Friedman, (c) the categorical method of Peter Freyd. In Section 2 we use the realizability method to prove the fundamental theorem and also to extend Troelstra's Uniformity Property to higher order arithmetic.
In Section 3 we collect all kinds of theorems from logic that deal with the representability of functions N" -+N in intuitionist type theory. These will later enable us to discuss certain arrows in the free topos. Most of these results are essentially contained in the book by Kleene. In Section 4 we give a construction of the free topos which is based on the language of intuitionist type theory developed in Section 1. Constructions using somewhat different languages have been given by Coste, Fourman and Boileau; but the first construction of the free topos is due to Volger, who used an altogether different approach.
We also study the arrows between certain objects in the free topos, namely those objects which correspond to types. In particular, we show that all arrows 1 -+-h; are standard numerals, that all arrows NX -+N induce recursive functions N"-+N and that not all recursive functions are obtained in this way. These results have already been found by Boileau and the Costes. We also show that all arrows R-N and PB-N factor through 1.
The universal property of the free topos had been shown by Volger for his construction, only the morphisms in his category of toposes were not strict functors. None of the other authors established the universal property for their construction or proved it equivalent to Volger's. We therefore devote Section 5 to proving the universal property of the present construction of the free topos. One of the present authors had already shown that Volger's logical functors could be made strict b> stipulating that all toposes have canonical subobjects. Our original intention had been to use methods of mathematical logic to obtain results in category theory, to wit, properties of the free topos. In the mean time Peter Freyd made a fundamental breakthrough, which suggests that the more interesting applications may be in the opposite direction.
As an afterthought, we therefore added Section 6, in which the 3-property and the Uniformity Property are proved again, and perhaps with less effort, by Freyd's method.
We are endebted to Michael Makkai and Andrej &"edrov for helpful comments,
Intuitionist type theory
We shall present a language 1/l for intuitionist type theory with product types.
Definition 1.1. Type symbols are defined inductively as follows:'
(i) 1, N, 0 are types; (ii) if A and B are types, so are A x B and PA. ' It is understood that nothing is a type of .f, unless its being so follows from (i) and (ii). i/ I is not just a language, but also a deductive system. For each set X of variables, we introduce a relation pkxq between formulas p and q whose free variables are contained in X. The relation I-_X is subject to four groups of axioms (and is assumed to be the smallest such relation).
Structural Axioms
(1) I-_X is reflexive and transitive; (2) 
(c) Products
I-VxelX=*; +vtl;EAXB 3xe.A 3,"EBz=(X,y); + VJEA VYEA Vl.EB V,"'EE (o&Y) = (x',y'> =(x=x'Ay=y')).
~vtluEp,i((OEUAvxcN(XEU=SXEU))=v."E,VYEU).
Remarks.
The logical axioms are somewhat non-standard (see e.g. [13, p. 981 The reader who is willing to accept Theorem 1.3 without proof may immediately turn to Section 3, Section 2 being concerned with the proof of Theorem 1.3 using the notion of realizability.
Another proof will be given in Section 6. It should be pointed out that the language 21 has many variants. Originally we had considered a language 2~ which admits also projection symbols rc and rc' and requires a change in the statement of the product axioms. In Section 2 we shall meet a language YO which lacks comprehension terms and requires a change in the statement of the comprehension axiom. Of course, assertion (3) of the fundamental theorem will not hold for ~0.
Finally, we remark that Theorem 1.3 establishes the consistency of the other versions of type theory as well. Extending Godel's double negation translation (see [13] or [26] ) we also obtain the consistency of classical type theory (with comprehension and extensionality). Now, by Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, the above consistency proof must use proof-theoretical methods not available in type theory. Already in first-order arithmetic a consistency proof requires transfinite induction on EO (induction on ordinals <EO being in fact derivable). So, to formalize the above consistency proof via the fundamental theorem (whose proof uses realizability) presumably requires transfinite induction on quite large ordinals (see [4] ).
Suppose next that we allow a variable z of type C as a "parameter".
In other words, we study the language UI(Z> whose closed formulas are the formulas of Y'I which may contain free occurrences of z but of no other variable. An examination of the proof of the fundamental theorem will show that it remains valid when I-is replaced by t-:, as long as C= Q or PB. (Here, and elsewhere, we write kZ for t-iZ).)
In particular, (3) then becomes:
for some term a(z) of type A.
As a consequence of (3:) we obtain the following, which is also known as the Uniformity Property [27] .
The purpose of this section is to prove the fundamental theorem of intuitionist type theory. It is convenient to do this for a language Y, which is equivalent to 2 r, but has fewer names and avoids nested comprehension terms, yet still has enough names to witness all existence theorems. On the way to introducing I! 1, we shall also mention another language YO, which is still equivalent to YI, but has no comprehension terms at all.
We shall prove the fundamental theorem for I( using the profound KleeneFriedman method of realizability, as developed for related languages in [7, 23, 253 . Roughly speaking, the idea is to define a predicate R@), meaning "formula p is realizable", by induction on the complexity of p, and then to prove a Soundness Theorem: if c-p then R@), from which the fundamental theorem follows.
The difficulty is that the natural definition of R(a E {XE A 1 rp(x)}) should be R(&a)); however, q(a) may be more complicated than the original formula! To overcome this difficulty, which is inherent in type theory, we follow Friedman in splitting each comprehension term into many "indexed" comprehension terms. This gives rise to yet another language z!+, and it is in ir+ rather than Y that realizability is defined. Thus we are dealing with four languages:
We believe that our treatment somewhat simplifies the details in the cited papers,
A property of 2j
We begin by proving a property of 9'1. We shall write p = p(X), where X is a set of variables, to indicate that all free variables occurring in p are elements of X. 
The language r/o
The language C/I has, in some sense, more names than necessary. We shall construct a language 20 which has too few names. It is like Yt except that it lacks comprehension terms {SEA / w(x)) and aE a with a of type R not a variable. Thus formation rule (5) is deleted and rule (4) is restricted in case A = R : a E a will be a term of type R only if a is a variable. The axioms for 20 are the same as those for ~1, except that the comprehension scheme is replaced by the following: From now on + denotes provability in Y, unless otherwise specified.
The language I/ +
The language ii + is an extension of ?a like Y, but obtained by "indexing" the comprehension terms clp= {XEA /p(x)).
Thus, we shall replace cV by ci, where the index denotes a subset V of [A] to be defined presently. In view of the intended isomorphism between R and Pl, we shall also index closed terms p of type 0 in the context p E cz.
The that is, given R(cp(a)) and +&a)-, we shall show that R(cp(a')). We proceed by induction on the complexity of p(x). By this we shall mean the number of occurrences of A, V, =, V and 3, provided cc'and p, are regarded as "opaque": their complexity is zero, even if I&) or p should contain one of the symbols which are being counted.
The proof will consist of an examination of the following nine cases: (1) If q(x) does not contain x, there is nothing to prove.
, we are given that R(p,(a)) and l-~;(a)-for i= 1, 2. By inductional assumption we may infer that R(cpl(a')) and R(rpz(a')), hence that
, we are given that R(cp~(a)) and +~;(a)-for i= 1 or i= 2, say the former. Then, by inductional assumption, we may infer that R(pl(a?) and, by (I), that I--rpi(a')-, hence that R(rpl(u') v e~z(a')). (4) If q(x) = VI(X) * cpz(x), we distinguish three cases. Case (i): not k_c~~(a)-. Then also not +_cPI(o')-, by (I). It follows trivially that R(P I (a? = rpz(a?).
Case (ii): +~PI(u)-but not R(cp~(a)). Then t-PI-, by (I), and not R(rpl(a')), by inductional assumption. It follows trivially that R(rp~(a') = cpz(a')).
Case (iii): +91(a)-and R(cpt(a)
). Since we are given that R(9r(a)=rpl(a)), it follows that R(9z(a)). Since we are given that c91(a)-=,92(a)-, it also follows that +92(a)-. By inductional assumption we may infer that R(cpz(a)), hence that R(cpl(Q? = v2(4).
(5) If ~p(x)=v,~~g 9(x,y), we are given that, for all ~E[B], R(w(u,~)) and 1-9(a,6)-. Now 9(x,6) is less complex than tlYc~ W(X,JJ), hence we may apply inductional assumption and obtain R(v(a', b)). This being so for each b E [B], we infer that R(VYE B ~(a', b)).
(6) If 9(x)= gve8 I,U(X,JJ), we are given that, for some 6~ [B], R(t,~(a,b)) and +9(a,6)-. As above, we infer that R(~(a',6)). But also t-9(a',6)-, by (I), hence R(3,,8 w(a',y)).
(7) If 9(x)=x (of type Q), we make take asp, and a'=qj. Since a-b, we have i= j and t-po q. Now we are given that R@,), whence i= 1. Since j = i= 1, we surely have R(q;).
It only remains to discuss 9(x) E/?(X) E y(x), where /3(x) is of type B and y(x) of type PB. We have two possibilities for y(x), namely y(x)=cr and y(x)=x.
(8) If 9(x)+(x)4, we are given that R(cp(a)), that is, @a)~ W, and want to deduce that R(yl(a')), that is, P(U) E W. This follows from (III) and the fact that W is closed under -.
(9) If 9(x) I&X) EX, x of type PE, we may take u= cr and a'= CT, where l-c, = Cw'. We are given that R((o(a)), that is, P(~)E W, and want to deduce that R(cp(a')), that is, /?(a')~ W. This follows as above.
Soundness
We shall now define a mapping %'+ Y'+. If q is any formula of Y; we define a formula q+ in Y'+ by replacing every occurrence of C~ by CL@', where V(9) = set of all a E [A] such that R(9(a)) and +9(a-), and every occurrence of a closed term p of type Q in Yb in the context p E ct by pi@), where
Recall that there are no nested comprehension terms. Note that i(p) corresponds to I'@) under the intended isomorphism between 52 and Pl which replaces p by fi= {XE 1 Ip}, except that we have written i(p) = 0 or 1 where IQ) = 0 or { *}.
It remains to check that V(9) satisfies the conditions on indices: (a) if a~ V(9) then +9(a-); (b) if UE V(9) and a-a' then a'~ V(9). Here (a) is immediate from the definition of V (9), and (b) asserts:
if R(cp(a)) and I-~(K) and a-a' then R(p(a')) and +$$a'-), which follows immediately from Proposition 2.5 (IV) and (I).
lnrurrionisr rvpe rheory and rhejree top05 2'7 Proposition 2.6 (Soundness). To look at another example, suppose the last step in the proof was:
If p t-x q in .t, then R@ * = q '). In particular, if k-p, then R@ ').
rp(X)AW(X) k{wl X(X) lo(x)+{xl r&)=x(x)'
We are given that R(y, +(a)) and t-rp(a-) and want to show that R(t+v +(a) = x +(a)). So let R(v+(a)) and t-_w(a-) be given, we want to show that RQ+(a)). Now R(cp+(a)l\v+(a)) and +-cp(a-)r\u/(a-), hence R(;C-(a)), in view of the inductional assumption that R((a,+(a)All/'(a))~~+(a)).
We shall go through the various nonlogical axioms p to show that R@-). Under the heading of extensionality we also have to realize Vsso VrEo ((so t) = s=t). Thus, for each pi, qi~[Q], we must show that R(@;eq;)*pi=qj).
So we assume R@,-q,) and +-poq, and want to show that R@;=q,). We know that t--p = q from extensionality. Suppose i = 1, then R@,) and +p, hence, from R(p,-q;) we deduce R(qJ, and so j= 1. Similarly j= 1 implies i= 1. Therefore, i=j, and so p,-q;, hence R@;= q,), by Proposition 2.5 (II).
(c) Producfs: to realize V.rc I A-=*, it suffices to realize *= *, which follows from Proposition 2.5 (II).
To realize VZE~x~ gXE,4 3.v6~z= (x,y>, we takeany (a,b) E[A xB] and need only realize (a, b) = (a, b), which also follows from Proposition 2.5 (II), and prove that +_(a-,!~-) = (a,!?-), which is evident.
To realize
we take any a, a
'~ [A] and any 6, b'~ [B], and assume that R((a, b) = (a',b')) and that ~-_(a; 6-) = (Q'-, b'-). We want to show that R(a = a') and R(b = b'). Now, for each y E [P(A x B)], we can realize (a, b > E ye (a', b') E y, and we would like to realize, for each a E PA, that a E (Y t, 0'~ cr. Thus, given R(a E (r) and +-a-~ (r-, we want to show that R(a'ECr).
We may take CZ=C:, then we are given that a6 Vand +&a-) and want to show a'~ V. To this purpose take y E cr, where
It is easily verified that Wsatisfies the conditions on indices since Vdoes. Moreover, it is easily seen that the given pair (a, b) E W, since a~ V, and that +_(a; b-> E y-, since FQ+-). Since we can realize that (0,
Peano axioms: to realize Vre,v (Sx= 0 = I), we may assume that, for a given numeral ft = S"0, R(Sit = 0) and +SA = 0, and we want to show that R( l_), that is, we want to derive a contradiction. Now R(Sii =0) means that, for all C:E [PM, R(Sii E ego 0 E CL). In particular, 0 E V and r-p(O) imply SA E V. We shall deduce a contradiction from this by a particular choice of ci. Take &x)=x=0, v= {O}, then V is easily seen to satisfy the conditions on indices. Moreover Sil E V if and only if Sit ~0, which is false, while OE V and r-p(O).
To realize Vxe,v Vye~ (Sx= Sy=x=y), we take any numerals rft and if and want to realize Srfl = Srf = M = A. So suppose R(Sm = St?) and G/71 = Sii, we want to infer that R(m = n). Thus we want to show that, for each C:E [PM, R(rf~ E cg= A E ci), and similarly for the converse. So, given fi E V and i+(m), we want to show n E V. It is easily checked that v' satisfies the two conditions on indices because V does. Now, the given data translate into SHi E v' and +-(p'(Sfi). Since R(Sfi~c;= Srf E cr), this implies SI? E v', that is, fi E V.
To realize the induction axiom, take CUE [Pw and assume that R(0 E c:), that is, OE V, and that R(V.~,N(XEC~ =,SXEC~)). We want to show that R(VYE,~ y~cz), that is, if E V for all rt. Since R(it E ci =Sit~ CL), we know that il E V and +9(it) implies Sir E V, hence, in view of the first condition on indices, that ii E V implies ME V. But also OE V, and so the desired result follows by induction.
This completes the proof of the Soundness Theorem.
Remark. It should perhaps be pointed out that, in spite of its name, the Soundness Theorem shows that realizability is a rather paradoxical concept: even contradictions may be realized. To see this, let p be any closed formula, then up is short for p= I. Therefore
R( up) if and only if R(p) and k-p implies R( I ). Now R( J_ ) is false and, by the Soundness Theorem, kp implies R(p). Thus R( up) if and only if not t-p.
Suppose now p is any undecidable proposition, then not k-p and not I-up, hence R( up) and R( 1 up), and therefore R( ~pr\ 11~).
As a corollary to the Soundness Theorem we obtain the fundamental theorem for I/. 
) if kpvq, then I-P or t-q; (3) if I-ilXE~ 9(x), then +9(a-) for some a E [A].
Proof. For example, to show (3), suppose I---~~~A 9(x). Then, by the Soundness Theorem, R( ZixG~ 9+(x)), that is, R(rp+(a)) and 1-9(a) for some aE [A] .
Proof of fundamental theorem for 2 1
We are now in a position to prove the fundamental theorem for 21, namely Theorem 1.3. For example, we show: (3) if I-' !ixc,4 9(x), then I-' 9(a') for some closed term a' of type A.
Suppose I-' gxe,4 9(x). Now, by Corollary 2.3(l), ciXI 9(x) * 9'(x). hence E' jxe~ 9'(x). Therefore, by Corollary 2.3 (2), I-' 3.re~ 9'(x). Since 20 is contained in Y, + gxe~ 9'(x). Therefore, by Corollary 2.7, +9'(a-) for some UE [A] . Since Y' is contained in Y I. t-' 9'(a-), and so +' gse,4 (9'(x) A x= a-). Recalling once more that ›1~) 9(x) b cpr(x), we obtain +-I 3,V, A (9(x) A x = a-), and so I-I 9(a).
Presence of a parameter
Let C= R or PB and suppose z is a variable of type C. We shall regard z as a parameter, that is, it will be constant throughout the present discussion; in particular, it will never become bound. p'(z) will be the language whose closed terms and formulas may contain free occurrences of z but of no other variable. We shall examine what happens to Section 2 if Y is replaced by Y(Z).
Y(Z) contains comprehension terms {XE A / cp(z,x)}; but we must remember never to replace z by another comprehension term. The "closed" terms in [A] may now contain occurrences of 2. In particular, [PA] will contain cr where cV= {XEA I&z,x)). When C=Q, [Q] will contain z;; but, since not I--:z, we must have i=O, and so [Q] will contain only ZO. The proof of Proposition 2.5 remains valid.
In defining the mapping Y (z)-t Y (z) +, we replace z by zo if C= Q. When C= PB, we shall replace z by zO, which we define to be c;~ ;, where cVE ;= {y E B 1 y E z}. (The reader will check that in cIE; the first condition on indices forces V= 0.) The proof of the Soundness Theorem remains valid.
In view of these considerations, we have established (3;) of Section 1, hence also the Uniformity Property for YI, that is, Theorem 1.4.
It is instructive to realize that the proof of the Soundness Theorem would not remain valid in the presence of a parameter of type C= N. Indeed, in realizing the induction axiom, we had to show that R(V YE,~y~ CL), which amounted to showing that Vcontains all closed terms A of type N. This was proved by induction on n; but there is no way of showing that the parameter z of type N is in V.
Representability
In this section we discuss how to represent recursive functions in type theory. Although most of the results are well-known, we emphasize those aspects useful in category-theoretical applications (see Section 4).
All the languages we are dealing with contain numerals O, i,2, . . . . In our languages Yo, 9'1 etc. rt 3 570.
A formula ~(xi, . . . ,xk,y) represents a function f: N" --iv provided In the literaturefis then said to be "strongly" representable. For our present purposes, "intuitionist type theory" will mean YI and "classical type theory" will mean Y'I with the Boolean axiom added.
Remark 3.1. In intuitionist type theory, (2) implies (1).
Proof. For simplicity take k = 1 and assume that I-3!ys~ cp(fi,y). It follows from the fundamental theorem that I--cp(Pr, ff) for some no N. Moreover, if also +-rp(rfl,n'), then +-~t =z hence n = n' by consistency, which is also contained in the fundamental theorem. The following was discovered by Verena Huber-Dyson
[ 11,221. (2) . then it is also represented by a formula q~ satisfying (3) , that is, numeralwise representability implies strong representability.
Proposition

In classical type theory, if f is represented by a formula p satisfying
Proof. For simplicity we take k= 1. Suppose p(x,y) satisfies (2) For the proof see [S, 13,241 . It appears in the proof that the formula 9 representing a recursive function may be assumed to satisfy (2), hence (3).
Given a formula &x,y) with x and y of type N, clearly (1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a function f : N-N which is represented by p. In intuitionist type theory (1) is implied by (2) , in view of Remark 3.1, hence by (3). Unfortunately, in classical type theory neither (3) nor (2) will assure that &x,y) represents a "total" function. Clearly, classically we have I-V~~,VC
Since 9 does not contain x, any function represented by 9 would have to have constant value 0 or 1. In either case, we would be able to decide p. Thus 9(x,y) satisfies (3) classically, hence (2), but does not represent a function.
The following is found in [13] . 
mk~N.
Proof. For simplicity we take k = 1. We assume that for each m E N we can find n E N so that 9(#1, ii) has a proof, let us say with Godel numberp. 
f is easily seen to be a recursive function. Moreover, it follows that +p(m,f(m)). Corollary 3.6. In intuition& type theory, suppose 9(x1, . . . ,xk,y) satisfies (1) (or (2) or (3)), then 9 represents a recursive function f.
Proof. From Proposition 3.5 we have hp(m,f(m)).
Therefore, f(m) = n implies t-9(@ A). Conversely, if +9(m,ii), it follows from (1) that +f(m) = ff. Since intuitionist type theory is consistent by the fundamental theorem, f(m) = n.
On the other hand we have the following. In intuitionist type theory, not every recursive function is representable by a formula satisfying (3) , that is, strongly representable.
Proof. Let E be the set of Godel numbers of proofs of formulas of the form VXs:v 3!yE,~ 9(x,y). For any eE E we thus have a formula 9&y) such that kV'xe,v 3 !wa.v 9dx,y). By Proposition 3.6, there is a recursive function fe represented by 9e. Now E is recursively enumerable, so let h enumerate it. Consider the function g We first verify that rp is decidable, that is,
~.(x,v,r}(P(X,Y,Z)Vl(P(X,Y,Z).
Indeed, given x and y, let zo be the unique z such that rp(x,Y,z). Now (t=zo)V
~(z=zo) and ((;=Eo)= CP(.U,Y,Z)) A (~(z=~o)=~(~(xY,~)), hence c,D(x,,~,z) v ~rp(X,Y,Z).
Since ~0 is decidable, we may apply the least number principle (see [13] ), and deduce that ~k',~~.v 3!,,E,~ u/(.~,y).
Why does I,Y represent f? In view of (3), it suffices to show that f(m) = n implies FIJI(@Z, ii). Suppose f(m) = n, then g(m, n) = 0 and, for all k< n. g(m, n) #O. Thus F-C&~, rf, 0) and, for all k < n, not k-(~(lfl, IF, 0). Because cp is decidable, we deduce by the fundamental theorem that, for all k< n, F--lq.$r?z,E,O), whence t-YzE,v (z< ii=, l&m,z,O)), hence I-IJI(~, ii) as required. This completes the proof.
It seems quite reasonable to expect the converse of Proposition 3.8 to hold too. Indeed, supposefis strongly representable. We saw in the proof of Proposition 3. j that where
It may be shown that h is primitive recursive, so it may be strongly represented by a formula x(x,y,z, t) and we need only verify that +V,Ye,~ !lyE,v ilZE,v x(x,y,z,O). In fact, it suffices to represent the primitive recursive predicate Proof( 'cp(m, n) ',p) by a formula <(x,y,z) so that ›tj,~~,v gye,v 3 iE.v t(x, y, z). Surely, the representation can be carried out, hence, for each rn~N, +EIYs~ 3,,,v <(m,y,z). All we require then is to show that one proof will do for all m, that is, F-,~ gYE~ 3zEh. <(x,y,z). If this could be shown, the proof of the converse of Proposition 3.8 would be complete.3
The free topos
In this section we study the so-called "free topos" T(f) generated by a graph f (at least when I-is the empty graph 0) with the help of the language 2'1. Constructions of T(0) using languages somewhat like 21 were carried out by Coste, Fourman and Boileau, although the essential idea in them goes back to an earlier, more circuitous construction of the free topos by Volger. We shall postpone discussion of the universal property of T(T) until Section 5. Instead we shall concentrate on an investigation of those arrows in T(0) whose source and target are determined by types of 2'1.
We shall require a definition of "topos" which is a little tighter than usual, in as much as products and exponents are not just required to exist but are posited as part of the structure of a topos. Moreover, these data are subject to the following equations, where l =-is written for equality between arrows in .v.
Predogmas
Terminal object: f . = l *A, for all f : A + 1. 
Product: 71.4, B (f, g >
l = l f, Tlk,s(f,g) l =*
The free topos generated by the empty graph
To any graph r we shall associate a topos T(T) called the "free topos" generated by I-. First we look at the special case when r is the empty graph 0. The arrows f : cr+j3 of ir(0) are triples (a, rI,/3), where IfI is a closed formula of type P(A x B) subject to two conditions:
(1) +vxerl ~."EB((X,Y)EVi=)(XE(rAtEp)), Wecallf=(a,VI,/I)andj-'=(a',If'J,/3')equalif I--a=cx', I--p=/?'and I--lfl=?f'l. We then writef*=*f'.
The identity morphism 1, : a+a is given by
Ilal={z~AxAl3
XEA (<x,x> =rAxEa)),
which may also be written as {<x,y)~AxAIx=yr\x~~}.
The composition off : a-/3 and g : p-y is given by gf : 1~4 y where
Igfl={(x,z)~AxC/3 YEB((X,Y)E~~IA(Y,Z)EI~I>}.
It is easily seen that T(0) is a category. To give T(0) the structure of a predogma we make the following definitions. TO avoid confusion with type symbols, ! and Q are underlined. 
axp~{(x,Y)EAxg(x~aAy~~~; I*,I={(x,y)~Axllx~aAy=*); In,,3/ ={((x,y),x')E(AxB)xAIxeaAyE~Ax=x'};
I n&pl = similarly; [16] . To give T(0) the structure of a topos, we first define T Note that T, @, 0 and $ are underlined to distinguish them from the corresponding symbols in the language 2 I.
~~~l={((u,x),t)~(PAxA)xQ~(x~u)=t~x~aAu~Pa};
I(f,g)lr{(z,(x,y))ECx(AxB)/(z,x)ElflA(z,Y)Elgj},
The free topos generated by any graph
We recall that a graph, that is, an orientedgraph, consists of two classes, the class of arrows and the class of objects, and two mappings from the former to the latter, called source and target. One writesf : A + B for source(f) = A and target(f) = B. A category is thus a graph with additional structure. A morphism F : r-f' of graphs sends arrows and objects of I-to arrows and objects of f' so that f : A -13 implies
F(j) : F(A)-F(B).
When f is any graph, we may construct T(T) from a language 21(r) in a similar fashion to the construction of T(0) from Y I. Primitive types of 2'1 (r) are not only 1, 52 and N, but also all objects of f. Moreover, for any arrowf : X+ Y of r and any term < of type X, we stipulate thatfr is a term of type Y. T(T) comes equipped with a morphism from the graph r into the underlying graph of T(T).
Arrows bet ween types
With any type A of irt there is associated an object 4 of T(O), where
is the universal set of entities of type A. An arrow 4 -, B is determined by a formula 9(x,y) such that +V.rs~ 3!,,~ 9(x&.
For example, an arrow 1'4 is given by a formula 9@)=9(*,y), since any variable of type 1 is provable equal to *, such that I-~!,.~E I&). By the fundamental theorem, there is a closed term b of type B such that Fly(b), hence I-(~,~J 9(x,y) *y = b. Thus the arrow is given by the explicit equation y = b.
To obtain a survey of all arrows 4 -+@ in T(0) we observe that 4 is isomorphic to Hence we may replace 9(x, w) by the explicit equation w = t(x), where t(x) is a term of type PC.
Since 12s Pl is any predogma, we can also describe arrows 4-Q explicitly. Indeed, from t-VxE~ 3!,,o9(x, t) one deduces, as a special case of the above, that +-(.r./)rp(x, t) e t=q$x, T).
To study the arrows 4 -+fi, we shall first look at two special cases: A = N" and A = PC. We saw in Section 3 that the arrows Nk+N are determined by formulas which represent certain recursive functions.
Arrows PC-+I1/are determined by formulas 9(w,x), where +V,+,E~~3!xei~9(~,~). Now the uniformity property allows us to infer +-3.~s,v V,+E~c9(w,x). Hence, by the fundamental theorem, there is a numeral it such that ~-V~~~c~p(w,if). It follows that E-(,,.,~~(P(w,x)~x=A, hence we may factor PC+@ as pC-1-y.
In other words, all arrows PC-Y, hence also Q-y, are constants. - Therefore, by the uniformity property or the fundamental theorem for ZL I(W), +vt/,EPc(P(% w,f(m)),
wherefis some function N"+N. On the other hand, substituting C for w in (l), we obtain +Vxe,Vc 3!vEN(P(X, C,Y>.
Therefore, there is a representable recursive function g : Nk-+N such that, for all
mENk, W(fi, G g(m)).
Comparing this with (2), we see thatf=g is a representable recursive function. Applying the functor I-= .
-J(!, -) to the arrow 4 +I$ we see that T(A)-+T(w factors as follows:
where f is a representable recursive function. Perhaps a more refined argument will show that already the arrow 4 -+y factors as
We summarize the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4. The following hold in T(0): (1) Every arrow ! '4 is given by an equation y = 6, b a term of type 4. (2) Every arrow A-PC or ,j --+c is given by an equation w = t(x), where f(x) is a --term of type PC or Q respectively. (3) Every arrow yk-+y represents a recursive function Nk-+N. (4) Every arrow PC-N or $?-+efactors as PC+ ! +fi or Q-1 -+N respectively. (5) Everyarrow~=,II"x~x...x&+N~sent byr=.J(!,-) onto
where f is a representable recursive function. (1) and (3) of the above theorem were first explicitly obtained by Boileau, essentially by the Kleene-Friedman method of Section 2. Related results were also asserted by the Costes, using the cut-elimination method of Gentzen-Girard. (2) is suggested by the work of Fourman.
(4) was conjectured by Andre Joyal; we originally had the weaker version that r
(PC)*T(i?i)
is constant, which we proved -with the help of the Godel-Rosser incompleteness theorem.
Arrows in the free Boolean topos
While it follows from (1) that every arrow I-llJ in the free topos T(0) is given by a standard numeral, this is not so in the free Boolean topos (see Example 3.4 with k = 0).
Not every recursive function f : Nk-N comes from an arrow I?Jk-+N in T(0) (see Proposition 3.7); however, it does come from such an arrow in the free Boolean topos (see Theorem 3.3(i) ).
In the free Boolean topos, not every arrow fl"-I~/ gives rise to a total function Nk-*N (see Example 3.4); but if it does, then this function is recursive (see Theorem 3.3(ii)).
The universal property of the free topos
The free topos T(T) generated by the graph r comes equipped with a morphism
in the category of graphs and has the following universal property: given any graph f and any morphism G from I-to the underlying graph of a topos .Y-, there is a unique arrow F : T(T)-+.7 in a suitable category of toposes such that FH= G. Of course, this means that Tis the left adjoint of the forgetful functor from toposes to graphs. It asserts, in the special case when I-is the empty graph 0, that T(0) is an initial object in the category of toposes.
The universal property was first obtained by Volger, for another construction of T(T), with some handwaving: for him G was not a functor but only a pseudofunctor and its uniqueness held only up to isomorphism. All this was straightened out in [16] , by confining attention to toposes with canonical subobjects.
In this section we shall establish the universal property of T(0), as constructed from ~1, by showing that it is an initial object in the category of toposes with canonical subobjects.
Indeterminates
One may adjoin an indeterminate arrow x : 1 -A to a predogma .:J, when A is an object of .:1. The resulting predogma :/[x] has the expected universal property. Moreover, each morphism 9(x) : 1 +B in .Y/[x] has the form 9(u) l 70 fx, where f : A + B is a uniquely determined arrow of .d. Here l 2 9 denotes equality in .:/&I. For details of this construction see [16] .
If X= {XI, . .. can be extended to all terms of the language :f I provided .ri is a topos or, more generally, a "dogma", which we shall not define here. It should be pointed out though that, even when -1' is a topos, Y [x] is only a dogma and not a topos. We note that the interpretation of +,y in a topos can also be explained without mentioning subobjects. For example, if X= {x}, x of type A, f IX,f2X, . . . ,fnx+.< gx means this: for all objects C of 9 and all arrows h : C+A in .Y, iffih l = l T *c and fib .=. T*c... and fnh l =* T*c, then gh .=a T*c.
interpretation in a topos
The internal language of a topos
The language Y I studied so far is pure type theory. It contains no types other than those implied by Definition 1.1 and no terms other than those implied by Definition 1.2. Moreover, it is subject to no axioms other than those listed in Section 1. One may also consider various applied type theories extending :!I by permitting additional types, terms or axioms. In particular, the interpretation of the language Y I in a topos .-/ may be extended to the so-called internal language of that topos. This admits all objects of .Y/ as types and all arrows I -+C in .% as terms. To define Pf in a topos, we stipulate that, for an indeterminate v of type PB, We remark that all toposes occurring in nature have canonical subobjects and that every topos is equivalent to one with canonical subobjects. Moreover, the free topos T(f) constructed in Section 4 has canonical subobjects: with any monomorphism m : p >-, (Y we associate the isomorphic canonical subobject m' : /?' f-t a, where /3'= {xe A j 3ye~((~,~) E/ml)},
W'e recall [16] that in a topos with canonical subobjects there is a bijection
where char m is the characteristic morphism of m and ker h, the kernel of h, is the unique element m of Sub A whose characteristic morphism is h. We also recall [16, Lemma 9 .11 that in a topos with canonical subobjects the following equations hold, where we have written P,B l =* {VEPBi VYE8(_YEV=yEfi)}, Lemma 5.2. In a topos with canonical subobjects,
for allf: A-Q, g : B-R andp : 1 -+PB.
Universal property
For expository purposes we shall only establish the universal property of T(T) when I-is the empty category. In other words, vve shall show that T(0) is an initial object in the category Top whose objects are toposes with canonical subobjects and whose arrows are functors which preserve the predogma structure, the natural number object and canonical kernels exactly. This is easily shown [16, Lemma 9.21 to be equivalent to saying that the functors preserve the predogma structure, the natural number object, internal equality (hence all logical symbols) and canonical subobjects.
Very roughly speaking, the arrows in Top are the "logical functors" of the topos literature, but they are defined more tightly. The universal property of T(T) for an arbitrary graph r may be proved in the same way. First we define F(a) for any object a of T(0). Now a is a term of type PA in 2-1, which may also be interpreted as an arrow 1 --PA in 7. As in any predogma, this gives rise to a unique arrow a' : A-Q in .X We define F(a) = Ker(a'), by which we mean the source of ker(a').
That this definition is forced upon us is seen as follows. Consider the canonical monomorphism m a : a-4 in T(0) given by
Im,I={(x,x)EA xA/xca).
Its characteristic morphism may be calculated4 to be the arrow a' : d+Q which corresponds to a : l-P.+. Thus m, l = l ker(a'), hence a = Ker(a') in r(0). Note that the first a in this equation refers to an object of T(0). while the second a refers to the arrow !-PA in T(0). Applying the functor Fto this, which preserves kernels, the predogma structure (hence the symbol '), the natural number object and all logic symbols (hence the term a), we obtain F(a) = Ker(a') in .Y, Next, we wish to define Fcf) for any arrowf : cr-+~ in 1(O). We recall that Ifi is a term of type P(A x B) such that (i) +Vxc,4 Vyra ((,~,u,y)~lf/=,(~~aAy~P)), (ii) +VlE.4(xE a* 3!ve~(x,y) E IfI). Now let x : 1 -*F(a) be an indeterminate of type F(a) = Ker(a') over -7, Put na==* ker(a') in 7, 
=. T*F(~).
But Ker(P') = F(J); hence there exists a unique arrow Fcf) :
It follows that Fcf) is the unique arrow such that
It is tedious but routine to verify that F thus constructed is a functor which preserves the predogma structure. For example, let us show that Applying the functor F to this, we obtain,
F(a x/l) = F(a) x F(p).
(1)
These equations are utilized in checking that /3' is the characteristic morphism of n, ker F(h), but we omit the routine verification here. Since na l = l ker F(u') and ker F(h) are both canonical subobjects, so is their composition. Therefore, in view of (2), na ker F(h) l =-ker (p') l =* no-=* naF(ker h). Now n,, being an equalizer, is a monomorphism, and so the result follows. Finally, to prove the uniqueness of F, suppose that F : T(O)-.? is any functor which preserves the predogma structure, the natural number object and kernels, then we claim that F(f) must be as defined, that is, k-r (n,x, npFU)x> E IfI must hold in J[x] for any indeterminate .Y : l-F(a).
Eliminating the symbols E and I-~ from this, we thus want to show that ~~x~<lfl, (na,ngFCf))~) '5:' T, that is, EAXB (l_I-j*~(a), (n,,npR_O)) l =* T*F(~J. Now this equation in .J is obtained by applying the functor F to the following equation in T(0): E+~(lfl*ar (m,,rnpf)) l =* T*a.
A tedious but routine calculation shows that this equation does indeed hold in T(0).
Postscript on the Freyd cover
When we presented the above results at a conference in the fall of 1978, Peter Freyd immediately realized that the g-property asserts the projectivity of 1 and that the v-property asserts the indecomposability of 1 in the free topos. He then went ahead and proved the projectivity and indecomposability of 1 directly. We shall give a brief sketch of his ideas and show how the g-property and v-property may be deduced, then generalize his method to obtain also the Uniformity Property. .-i' is also a topos (if .-i is) and G is then a logical functor.
Here is the crux of Freyd's argument. He observed that the terminal object i of :i is trivially projective (and indecomposable). Now, if .Y = T(0) is the free topos, then there is also a unique logical functor F : .N -.:/' and GF is the identity functor on :I. It follows that 1 is also projective (and indecomposable) in T(0).
We wish to check that this argument remains valid if we operate entirely in the category Top, whose arrows are strict functors that preserve everything on the nose. To this purpose we must present some technical details. is the arrow 1 -PA corresponding to h : A-Q in .Y. We wish to verify that :? is a predogma in the strict sense of products and exponentiation being part of the structure and that G preserves the predogma structure exactly. As regards objects, this follows from what has been said above. As regards arrows, it may also be readily checked.
Next, we wish to verify that .:? has canonical subobjects and that G preserves kernels. Now it is easily seen that an arrow This allows us again to check that .-? is a topos.
Since F preserves the predogma structure and kernels, it also preserves internal equality and therefore all logical symbols, as has already been pointed out. Proof. Suppose J g : ,fT-+ y are such that fe l = l ge. We shall prove that t-Ifi = Ig/.
We argue informally thus: suppose (_v, z> E ifi. By assumption on e, there is an x E A such that (x,,v) E lej, hence (x,~) E ifei = Igel. Therefore, there exists ~'EB such that (y', :> E igl and (xy') E /e/. But, since e is an arrow in T(0), y'=y. hence (y, ; > E lg/. Therefore !fl c /g/, and similarly ;g: c ifl.
New proof of the g-property
Suppose (4(x) is a formula in i I, x being a variable of type A, and suppose By the lemma below, we can find a term a of type A so that t-v(a), hence also kq(a). Now suppose kpvq, then I-3 xe,vrp(x). Therefore, by the 3-property, +&it) for some numeral rf. Now either t-if =0 or l-l(A =O). In the first case t-p, in the second case +q.
We turn now to another proof of the Uniformity Property by looking at the Freyd cover of a topos obtained from the free topos and an arrow z : l+H(C) so that the pair (H,z) is initial in the category of all pairs (F: Jcy'-' 2, c : 1 jF(C)). Unfortunately, when we work with d/C', this seems to be true only "up to isomorphism". Be that as it may, in the case d = T(0) of interest to us, when C is a type in Yt and g : 1-C an indeterminate arrow, there is another construction of d(z) for which the above universal property holds in the strictest sense. We proceed as in the proof of the Sproperty, but with a parameter z present. It follows that F: 9(z, a(z)) for some term U(Z) of type N. However, in 2 I(Z) there are no such terms except numerals. Thus a(z)=it, hence +VzEc9(z,if), and therefore + 3."ES V:EC9(lrY).
Appendix I
We shall prove the converse of Proposition 3.8 along different lines than those suggested at the end of Section 3. To illustrate the argument, we take k= 1.
Let T(e,m,n) be Kleene's T-predicate, as in [13, p. 2871 Without loss in generality one may assume that if r(e, m, n) and T(e, m, n'), then n = n', for example, by taking n as small as possible.
It is known that there is a primitive recursive function CJ such that U(n) = fe(m) in case there exist numbers e and m so that T(e,m,n). We shall also assume that a function symbol h has been adjoined to 2~1 such that +hA = E if and only if U(n) = k.
Church's Rule [26, p. 2581 asserts that if +Vxe~ 3,,,~9(x,y), then there is a number e such that i-VXe~ 3ve~(~(P,~, y) A 9(x, hy)). Proof. Suppose f : NdN is strongly representable by rp(x,y). Then
(1) +vXEiv 3 !veNVkY), (2) iff(m) =n, then k-_ul(m,it).
It follows from (1) that there is a number e such that +Vxaiv 3,vcdr(ex,y) A q(x, hy)).
Now define the function g : N-N by
g(m) = UbtT(e, m, n)).
We claim that (a) g is provably recursive, (b) g=f. This will complete the proof of the proposition.
To prove (a), we replace T by its characteristic function t, so that
t(e, m, n) =
We then have g(m) = U.h(t(e, m, n) = 0)).
To prove that g is provably recursive, it suffices to show that t(e, m, n), regarded as a function of its last two arguments, is strongly representable by a formula xe(x,y,z) such that ~V.r~,v3yE,~~e(~,y,0). Letxe(x,y,z)=(s(e,x,y)r\z=O)v(l r(e,x,y)r\z= 1). Proof. Take and check that the required equations holds. As for uniqueness, from &<*a, 1 a> l = l f(z) it easily follows that h l = l g.
Corollary 7.2. T(O)[<] z T(O)[.z].
The corollary is an immediate consequence of the proposition in view of the following "recognition lemma". This completes the proof.
